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REFLECTING ON THE VIRTUAL CHILD
PORN DECISION
BY DAVID L. HUDSON, JR.*

The 2002 Supreme Court term could well be most
remembered for its abundance of First Amendment cases involving
sexual expression.'
The Court addressed cases involving
pornography on the Internet,2 zoning of adult businesses' and socalled virtual child pornography.4
Perhaps the most controversial decision of the three
(particularly given its outcome) was Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition,5 the so-called virtual child pornography case. The Court
examined the constitutionality of two provisions of a federal law
designed to keep pace with technology called the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA).6 Six justices voted to
strike down one provision of the law, while seven justices voted to
strike down the other challenged provision.7 As Joan Bertin wrote:
"Curiously, the case that seemed most controversial yielded the
most clarity and consensus."8
The Free Speech Coalition, an adult trade association, and
others' made a facial challenge to the provisions. The statute
defined child pornography as follows:
[Any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video,
picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture,
whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other
means, of sexually explicit conduct, where .David Hudson, Attorney, First Amendment Center,
J.D. Vanderbilt
(1994)
1. Joan E. Bertin, Talking Dirty: First Amendment Cases to Defy
Traditional Conservative and Liberal Labels: Those Dealing with Sexual
Expression Are No Exception, N.J. L.J. July 29, 2002; David L. Hudson Jr.,
Prurient Protections, Prohibitions: This Term's Free-speech Cases Involve
Sexually Oriented Expression, 87 A.B.A. J. 32 (2001).
2. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 567 (2002).
3. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 428 (2002).
4. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1396 (2002).
5. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1389.

6. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000).
7. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1395.
8. Bertin, supra note 1, at 1.
9. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1398. The other plaintiffs included
Bold Type, Inc., a publisher of nudist lifestyle books, Jim Gingerich, a painter
of nudes, and Ron Raffaelli, a photographer of erotic images.
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(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use
of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or
modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging
in sexually explicit conduct;
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted,
presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that
conveys the impression that the material is or contains a
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct... o
The plaintiffs challenged subsections (B) and (D). They
argued that the "appears to be" and "conveys the impression"
language in those sections would criminalize as child pornography
material that did not involve the use of actual children.11 They
contended that the material would classify as "criminal
contraband," mainstream movies like Romeo and Juliet, The Blue
Lagoon, Fast Times at Ridgemont High, The Exorcist, Pretty Baby,
and Lolita. 2
The government countered with several arguments including:
(1) computer child pornography is often used to seduce children; 3
(2) pedophiles use computer child porn to "whet their own sexual
appetites;"14 (3) if computer child porn is allowed, it will make it
harder on the government to prove that images of child porn in a
defendant's possession are images of actual children;" and (4)
images of computer child porn "are often exchanged for pictures of
real children engaged in such conduct," which "helps to sustain the
market for the production of visual depictions that involve real
children."'"
In the Free Speech Coalition litigation, the lower courts were
split. In 1997, a federal district court granted summary judgment
to the government in an opinion with incredibly poor First
Amendment analysis."
Amazingly, the judge classified the
challenged provisions of the CPPA as content-neutral even though
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2002).
11. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1395.
12. Brief for Respondents at 6, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct.
1389 (2002).
13. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4-6, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122
S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
14. Id.
15. Id. at*5.
16. Id. at 6.
17. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, Docket No. C97-0281, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12212 at *23 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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they clearly restricted expression based on content.18 The district
judge misunderstood the application of the secondary effects
doctrine, failing to grasp the Supreme Court's own limitation that
a "listener's reaction to speech is not a valid secondary effect but a
primary effect."19
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed 2-1 and
sided with Free Speech Coalition. ° The court held that the "First
Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting a statute that
makes criminal the generation of images of fictitious children
engaged in imaginary but explicit sexual conduct." 2' According to
the Ninth Circuit, the CPPA radically changed the definition of
child pornography from material that harmed real children in its
production to bad ideas.22
The Ninth Circuit relied on the 1982 U.S. Supreme Court case
New York v. Ferber.2 In Ferber,the U.S. Supreme Court said that
the First Amendment did not protect child pornography because
"the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is
harmful
to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the
24
child. ,
Prior to the grant of certiorari in Free Speech Coalition, many
had believed that the government would prevail, resulting in the
CPPA being upheld. 2' Although the Ninth Circuit had ruled in
favor of Free Speech Coalition, four other circuits had upheld the
CPPA from constitutional attack.2 ' Further, the Ninth Circuit for
many years has had a higher rate of reversal than any other
circuit court of appeals.

18. Id. at *10. "The contested provisions of the CPPA are content-neutral
regulations. They have clearly been passed to prevent the secondary effects of
the child pornography industry, including the exploitation and degradation of
children and the encouragement of pedophilia and molestation of children." Id.
at *10-11
19. See David L. Hudson Jr., Dangerous Ripple Effects of Free Speech
Ruling, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 22, 1997, at A18. For further analysis of Secondary
Effects Doctrine see David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The
Eviscerationof FirstAmendment Freedoms, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55 (1997).
20. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).
21. Id. at 1086.
22. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
23. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
24. Id.
25. See Hudson, supra note 1 (quoting First Amendment expert Kevin F.
O'Neill: "If I were a betting man I would predict that the Court would side
with the [law's defenders] even though this Court has been so protective of
speech").
26. United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 915 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d
645, 648 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir.
1998).
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THE COURT'S OPINION

On April 16, 2002, the Supreme Court issued a dramatic
ruling that sided with the Free Speech Coalition. Justice Anthony
Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. He noted that the "appears
to be" and "conveys the impression" clauses could lead to the
banning of material that is neither obscene under Miller v.
California,nor child pornography under Ferber.7
The Court found persuasive the Free Speech Coalition's
argument that the broad language of the provisions could apply to
modern Oscar-nominated films such as Traffic and American
The Court further found that under such an
Beauty. 8
interpretation versions of Romeo and Juliet could also be
prohibited. 9
The court noted that the Ferber decision allowed the
prohibition of child pornography because of the harm caused by
the actual children used during the production of the material. °
However, the CPPA also criminalized material that did not involve
the use of actual children.3
The Court rejected the government's arguments for denying
First Amendment protection to computer-generated child
pornography that did not involve the abuse of children.32 The
government had argued that pedophiles would use the computergenerated porn to seduce children.33 The Free Speech Coalition
majority responded that "[t]here were many things innocent in
themselves, however, such as cartoons, video games, and candy,
that might be used for immoral purposes, yet we would not expect
those to be prohibited because they could be misused."34
The Supreme Court next addressed the argument that the
material prohibited by the CPPA whetted the appetites of
pedophiles. The Court found that there was not a sufficient reason
to ban materials, simply because there existed a possibility that
The Court
free speech might encourage unlawful acts.35
questioned the lack of evidence showing a connection between
computer generated porn and actual child abuse, and found that
"[tihe Government has shown no more than a remote connection
between speech that might encourage thoughts or impulses and
any resulting child abuse."36 The Court also recognized that
"[w]ithout a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1396.
Id. at 1400.
Id.
Id. at 1401.
Id. at 1402.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1403.
Id.
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that it may
Government may not prohibit speech on the ground
37
encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal conduct."
The Court dismissed the notions that virtual child porn
images had to be eradicated in order to dry up the market for
actual child porn. The Court also discussed the notion that virtual
images led to an increase in illegal child porn. The Court
responded, "The hypothesis is somewhat implausible. If virtual
images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal
images would be driven from the market by the indistinguishable
substitutes. Few pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing
real children if fictional, computerized images would suffice."38
The Court next turned to the government's third argument
that the existence of computer-generated child porn made it hard
for the government to prove that those who produced pornography
used real children.39 The government told the Court that it would
make it quite hard to prosecute child porn cases when virtual child
porn is identical to actual images of children." Experts would
have trouble testifying that certain images contained actual
children."
Justice Kennedy and the Court rejected this contention as
contrary to established First Amendment law, stating that:
The argument, in essence, is that protected speech may be
banned as a means to ban unprotected speech. This analysis
turns the First Amendment upside down. The Government
may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress
Protected speech does not become
unlawful speech.
unprotected merely because it resembles the latter. The
Constitution requires the reverse."
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1404. The Court also noted that even if the government's marketbased deterrence argument was valid, it would not support the statute
because "there is underlying crime at all" in the case of virtual child porn. Id.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1404. Kennedy's opinion read like a paean to the First
Amendment in places. Consider the following passages:
* The mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a
sufficient reason for banning it absent some showing of a direct
connection between the speech and imminent illegal conduct...
Id. at 1403.
• The prospect of crime, however, by itself does not justify laws
suppressing protected speech...

Id. at 1399.

* As a general principle, the First Amendment bars the government
Id.
from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear ....
" First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the
government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that
impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom,
and speech must be protected from the government because
speech is the beginning of thought.... Id. at 1403.
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Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion stressing
that "technology may evolve to the point where it becomes
impossible to enforce actual child pornography laws because the
Government cannot prove that certain pornographic images are of
real children."43 If the Government could show that defendants
were successful in beating child porn charges by using the
existence of computer-generated images to create reasonable
doubt, then Thomas stated that he might have voted differently.
But, he noted that the Government had not pointed to a single
case in which a defendant had been acquitted based on such a
defense.44
Justice O'Connor agreed that § 2256 (D) was unconstitutional
and agreed that "the CPPA's ban on youthful-adult pornography is
overbroad."" However, she voted to uphold the bulk of § 2256 (B),
the section with the "appears to be a minor" language, by
interpreting that provision to mean material that is "virtually
indistinguishable" from actual children.
She concluded that
materials that 'convey the impression' that they contain images of
actual children should not be banned as Constitutionally obscene,
but that she would ban pornographic depictions that actually
'appear to be' of minors, so long as the ban is not applied to
youthful-looking adult pornography. 7
Chief Justice William Rehnquist dissented, in an opinion
joined by Justice Scalia, 8 and voted to uphold both provisions.
Rehnquist also believed that the statute should be read so as to
apply only to images that are "virtually indistinguishable" from
that of minors. 9 He voted to uphold § 2256 (D) by interpreting the
"conveys the impression" language as applying only to the
0
"panderer.""
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

Congress reacted with predictable outrage to the Court's
decision, one congressman even saying that the Court had "sided
The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to
suppress unlawful speech. Protected speech does not become
unprotected merely because it resembles the latter. The
Constitution requires the reverse .... Id. at 1404.
43. Id. at 1406 (J. Thomas, concurring).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1408 (J. O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Id. at 1409.
47. Id. at 1411.
48. Id. at 1412. Scalia joined Rehnquist's opinion except for a paragraph
explaining the statute's legislative history. Id.
49. Id. at 1412, 1414. ("The CPPA is targeted to this aim by extending the
definition of child pornographer to reach computer-generated images that are
virtually indistinguishable from real children engaged in sexually explicit
conduct.")
50. Id. at 1413.
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with pedophiles over children."51 Attorney General John Ashcroft
said the Court's decision will make the government's
job in
2
fighting child porn "immeasurably more difficult.
Congress also responded with more than politically popular
rhetoric." U.S. Rep. Henry Brown, along with thirty-three cosponsors, responded with a proposal to amend the Constitution to
prohibit virtual child pornography.5 4 They hastily introduced the
Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002
(COPPA).55 The House passed the measure by a vote of 413-8. The
bill had not cleared the Senate at the time of this article, but
passage may soon be a foregone conclusion.
In its findings, the bill noted that the Ninth Circuit "has seen
a significant adverse effect on prosecutions since the 1999 Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Free Speech Coalition. '6
The bill deleted section 2256(D), the provision that seven
Justices of the Court struck down. The bill, however, has been
amended, and section 2256(D) now reads: "such visual depiction is
a computer image or computer-generated image that is, or is
indistinguishable..,
from, that of a minor engaging in sexually
57
explicit conduct."
The measure also seeks to get around the Free Speech
Coalition decision by introducing a new section entitled
"Prohibition of Obscenity Depicting Young Children."" This new
section criminalizes the production and distribution of a "visual
depiction that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a prepubescent child engaging in sexually explicit conduct.'"' 9
Perhaps the biggest change in the new bill is its focus on the
word "indistinguishable." The bill defines the term as follows:
[T]he term 'indistinguishable' used with respect to a
depiction, means virtually indistinguishable, in that the
depiction is such that an ordinary person viewing the
depiction would conclude that the depiction is of an actual
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. This definition
does not apply to depictions that are drawings, cartoons,
51. Jessica Sabbath, House panel alters 'virtual' child porn ban, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., June 30, 2002, at 10A.
52. Associated Press, Feds Ease Rules on Child Porn Charges, (April 17,
2002), available at http://courses.cs.vt.edu/-cs3604/lib/Freedom.of.Speech/
Sup.Ct.COPA.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
53. See supra note 46.
54. H.J Res. 106, 107th Cong. (2002); see also, Lauren Markoe, Some call
for
'virtual'
child
porn
amendment,
(July
21,
2002),
at

http://www.thestate.com/mld/state/news/politics/3705730.htm
Nov. 15, 2002).
55. H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002).
56. Id. at § 2(9).
57. Id. at § 3(a).
58. Id. at § 5.

59. Id.

(last

visited
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sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or adults."
Jeffrey Douglas, executive director of the Free Speech
Coalition, says the measure is "a combination of being a poorly
drafted bill and exceptionally difficult to parse out."'"
He points out that the new version of the statute attempts to
track the language in the Supreme Court's dissenting opinions,
meanwhile ignoring the decision and reasoning set forth by the
majority.2 According to Douglas, the majority held that there can
be no exception to the First Amendment right to free speech
involving child pornography unless the image contains a depiction
of an actual, identifiable child. 3
Douglas' analysis seems particularly astute with respect to
the fact that the new bill tracks the language of the dissenting
opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion and the
partial dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor both emphasized
that the CPPA should be interpreted to apply to images that are
"virtually indistinguishable" from images of actual children. 4
WHAT THE CASE SAYS ABOUT PARTICULAR JUSTICES

The Court's opinion in Free Speech Coalition confirmed
Justice Anthony Kennedy's stature as the Justice that is most
protective of First Amendment rights in many cases.6 ' Kennedy
showed a willingness to take a case involving expression that
many find repulsive, and write broad First Amendment principles
that will apply far outside that context.
For instance, his
statement in United States v. Playboy-"The history of the law of
free expression is one of vindication in cases involving speech that

60. Id. at § 5(c)(4).
61. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Douglas, Executive Director, Free
Speech Coalition (July 24, 2002).

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 1404, 1409, 1411 (J., Rehnquist,

dissenting).

Consider the language from Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent:

"Other than computer generated images that are virtually indistinguishable

from real children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, the CPPA can be
limited so as to not reach any material that was not already unprotected
before the CPPA" and "[t]he CPPA is targeted to this aim by extending the
definition of child pornography to reach computer generated images that are
virtually indistinguishable from real children engaged in sexually explicit

conduct." Id. at 1411, 1414. O'Connor's partial dissent interpreted the CPPA
to mean images "that are virtually indistinguishable from actual children."
Id. at 1409 (J. O'Connor, dissenting in part).

65. See Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 19942000, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1191, 1202 (2001) (ranking Justice Kennedy first as
ruling for First Amendment claims nearly seventy-five percent of the time
since 1994). An updated version of this article is available at
http://wwwl.law.ucla.edu/-volokh/howvoted.htm. (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
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many citizens may find shabby, offensive, or even ugly"66-is an
oft-cited phrase well on its way to becoming First Amendment
lore. This language, coupled with his concurring opinion in
67
Republican Party v. White, a case concerning restrictions on
judicial candidates' speech, confirm Justice Kennedy's strong belief
in the need to carefully protect First Amendment freedoms.
The Free Speech Coalition opinion also showed that Justice
Clarence Thomas can strike out on his own, writing his own
concurring opinions in First Amendment cases - even cases
involving sexual expression. Thomas surprised some with his vote
in Playboy and his concurrence in Free Speech Coalition is quite
similar. In fact, some commentators praise his concurring opinion
in Free Speech Coalition as the most sensible because he
recognized the danger of allowing defendants to escape prosecution
by raising a computer generated images defense. 8
Justice Stephen Breyer is slowly coming around now, in 2002,
to the First Amendment side in many cases. Though overall his
record in First Amendment cases is poor, 9 his joining of Kennedy's
opinion in Free Speech Coalition and Stevens' dissent in Alameda
show that perhaps he is becoming more sensitive to First
Amendment interests.
THE LASTING SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OPINION

The Supreme Court showed that it could conduct an
impressive First Amendment inquiry despite the heat of public
criticism. 0
Some critics of the Court said the decision was
symptomatic of a Court that has strayed far from the original high
purposes of the First Amendment.71 Robert Bork called the

66. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000).
67. Republican Party v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2544 (2002) (J. Kennedy,
concurring).
68. Roger Parloff, Stalled by Politics of Porn, LEGAL TIMES, July 15, 2002,
at 54. Parloff praised Thomas' concurring opinion as "sensible" for recognizing
the possible need to reassess ruling if government compiles better factual
record in the future. Id.
69. See Volokh, supra note 59 (ranking Justice Bryer the least likely of all
Justices to rule in favor of First Amendment claims, and showing that on
nearly forty percent of occasions since 1994 he has voted to rule against First
Amendment protections).
70. See Bertin, supra note 1 (stating that "[f]ree Speech Coalition reveals
the Court's willingness to undertake a principled analysis of highly volatile
and politicized issues."); Lawrence G. Walters, Adult Industry Update - May
2002, at http://www.ainews.com/story/3375 (last visited Sept. 29, 2002)
(stating that "despite the political heat that the Court knew that it would
draw, the decision is cast in broad, eloquent terms, and constitutes a
resounding victory for First Amendment principles.").
71. Robert Bork, How did 'virtual porn' end up with constitutional
protection?, at http://www.indybay.org/news/2002/04/125147.php (last visited
Sept. 29, 2002).
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opinion "ludicrous."72 Others said the case represented a classic
First Amendment victory. Law professor Marci Hamilton says the
case could actually contribute to the protection of children by
allowing artists the freedom to depict the evils of child abuse.73
On balance, the opinion was analytically sound because of the
Criminalizing
sheer breadth of the challenged provisions.
material as child porn when the material does not involve actual
children and may even involve actors over the age of eighteen is
bad law and bad policy. When the language of a statute could be
used to criminally charge the producers of Traffic, American
Beauty and Romeo and Juliet, the legislators had better go back to
the drawing board to craft a more narrowly tailored measure.
Often, Congress acts too hastily in passing legislation in the
technology arena. Recall the horrendously overbroad and vague
provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 struck
down by the Court in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.4
Congress quickly responded with the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA). Perhaps we will see the same pattern with the CPPA and
the COPA.
Whatever the future of COPA, Free Speech Coalition is
already making its mark on First Amendment jurisprudence, as
many other federal courts have already cited the case outside of
the child pornography area. The Sixth Circuit cited the case for
the principle that the mere tendency of speech to encourage
unlawful acts was not a sufficient reason to ban the speech. This
principle has appeared in an action to dismiss a lawsuit against
media companies blaming them for school shooting deaths. 6 A
dissenting judge in the Nuremberg Files case cited the case
repeatedly and even quoted the classic phrase: "The right to think
is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from
the government because speech is the beginning of thought. '77 A
federal district court also cited the case in striking down a state's
Internet indecency law. 8
Perhaps the most important aspect of the opinion was that
the Court stood firm and did not allow certain speech to be banned
merely because it "might" have a bad effect on certain listeners or
72. See George Gilder, Slouching Still, in AM. SPECTATOR, July/Aug. 2002
34 (interviewing Robert Bork about "pushy porn").
73. Marci Hamilton, The Supreme Court Gets It Right in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition: Why Allowing Speech Concerning Child Abuse Is More
Likely to Remedy Abuse Than Perpetuate It, (Apr. 25, 2002), available at
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com (last visited Nov. 23, 2002).
74. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
75. Id.
76. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002).
77. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058,

1097-98 (9th Cir. 2002).
78. Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 202 F.Supp. 2d 300, 317 (D. Vt. 2002).
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recipients.
The amicus brief of the Association of American
Publishers and others"9 alerted the Court to this danger: "If nonobscene sexually explicit images, the creation of which did not
involve actual children, can be banned based on their purported
effect on certain viewers, then the government could, in theory,
regulate any category of speech that could be asserted to have
some undesirable effect on certain recipients."8
A decision adopting such reasoning would further empower
legislators to make war upon popular culture. The producers of
rap lyrics, violent video games, and graphic movies could be
subject to criminal penalties.
The opinion primarily stands for the principle that speech
cannot be outlawed unless the government can establish a factual
record showing that the speech actually directly caused the harm.
If the government could compile a factual record that clearly
establishes that access to virtual child pornography leads to the
harm of actual children, then the issue should be considered. But,
the government in Free Speech Coalition failed to meet this
burden. In the words of Justice Kennedy, "the [g]overnment has
shown no more than a remote connection between speech that
might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child
abuse," and "[w]ithout a significantly stronger, more direct
connection, the Government may not prohibit speech on the
ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal
conduct.""'
The Supreme Court did not favor pedophiles over children, or
Instead, the Court
give a "green light to pornographers.""
protected freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and the First
Amendment.

79. See Brief of Amici Curiae Ass'n of Am. Publishers, Inc. at 18; Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 1389.

80. Id.
81. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 1403.
82. Jay Sekulow, The Supreme Court Missed the Mark on Virtual Child
Pornography,ACMd, available at http://www.aclj.org/resources/pornography/
jay-virtual-porn.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).

